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Abstract
Against the background of the economic and financial crisis, public finances severely deteriorated in many EMU Member
States and a new crisis, of sovereign debt, emerged. sibility for ensuring overall 
financial stability, our paper shortly overviews the main monetary policy measures it adopted since May 2010, proving the 
vital roleof ECB in countering the effects of the sovereigndebt crisis. The added value of our work mainly 
results from the coherent analysis of the interconnections between sovereign crisis, banking crisis and the real sector of the
economy, as determinants , as well as from highlighting the potential risks entailed by ECB
over the medium and long term.
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1. Introduction
measures undertaken by national authorities to rescue financial institutions in trouble, together with the cyclical
effects of the economic downturn on public revenues and expenditures and the discretionary fiscal stimulus
measures led, in many countries, to significant budget balance deterioration and increasing public debt over the
sustainable level. In some countries, like Greece or Italy, this added to some already existing budgetary
*Corresponding author. Tel.: +40-232-201-440; fax: +40-232-201-433.
E-mail address: aboariu@uaic.ro.
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
© 2012 The Authors. blished by Elsevier Ltd.
Selection and peer review under responsibility of Emerging Markets Que ies in Finance and Business local organization.
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
764   Angela Roman and Irina Bilan /  Procedia Economics and Finance  3 ( 2012 )  763 – 768 
vulnerabilities, reflected in high budget deficits and public debt prior to the crisis. Thus, to the initial financial 
and economic crisis, which seemed to be overpassed at a time, followed a new, sovereign debt crisis, perhaps 
with even more serious effects on the Euro area financial and macroeconomic stability. 
Against the new economic and financial background, debates intensified within the academic and banking 
community on defining the role that ECB should have in supporting for fiscal consolidation, also taking into 
account its main objective of ensuring and maintaining price stability in EMU, as well as the potential existence 
of conflicts between the two paths. In fact, it was generally admitted the need for ECB to intervene, provided 
that its fundamental objective is not jeopardized over the medium and long term. 
Our work follows three main directions. The first part deals with the methodological issues and offers a 
short review of existing literature, in order to highlight the place of our research. The second part of the study 
aims to highlight the interconnections between governmentdebt and banking sector crises, pointing out the risks 
for the manifestation of a systemic crisis in the euro area . 
The last part of the paper reviews the measures adopted by ECB in order to limit the impact of the sovereign 
debt crisis on the banking sector and thus on the supply of credit to companies and households, but also the 
potential risks entailed by these measures, over the medium and long term. 
2. Objectives of the research, methodology and state of knowledge 
Our paper seeks to answer two questions: 
 what is the connection between sovereign debt crisis and banking sector disruptions why should monetary 
authorities take action to solve public debt crisis? 
 how did ECB react to the recent Eurozone sovereign debt crisis and what are the potential risks entailed by 
such reactions? 
The study is primarily conceived as a theoretical approach, supported by the analysis of relevant statistical 
indicators on public finance and banking. As statistical data sources we used databases and reports of ECB, 
Eurostat and national central banks, as well as some published studies relevant for our research. 
Topical issues of present times, the sovereign debt crisis and its manifestation in some developed countries, 
mainly from the European Union represented, especially since 2010, when Greece first showed to be in 
financial distress, the subject of numerous theoretical or empirical studies. They mainly focused onthe causes 
and development of thecrisisas well as on the potential/effectively adopted policies by supranational/European 
or national authorities to cope with its effects, as shows Cline, 2011;Cafiso, 2012;Blundell-Wignall, 
2011;Shambaugh, 2012;Costancio, 2012. 
Based on the experience of previous crises, the literature points outthe existence of a close interdependence 
between the manifestation of sovereign debt and banking crisis. The studies undertaken by C.M. Reinhart and 
K.S. Rogoff, 2008 and 2009 show that previous banking crisis episodes were often accompanied by dramatic 
increases in public debt, not o , but 
especially due to the drastic contraction of GDP and the drop of tax revenues. 
At the same time, a reversed relationship is not to be excluded, public debt crises entailing potential risks for 
the banking sector. This connection is frequently invoked in the context of the currentEurozone public debt 
crisis, evidenced by the correlated evolution of bank and sovereign CDS, as evidenced in Blundell-Wignall, 
2011; Alter and Schuler, 2011;Angeloni and Wolff, 2012;Caruana and Avdjiev, 2012 and Shambaugh, 2012. 
The transmission mechanisms outlined in the literature are diverse and often ambiguous, mainly referring to: 
the lower value of bank assets due to their holding
decreases; the decreasingvalue of the guarantees that can be used for refinancing;the transmission of sovereign 
downgrades on the credit ratings of banks originating from that country; the smaller amount of implicit/explicit 
warranties granted to banks by governments in distress, as evidenced in BIS, 2011;Angeloni and Wolff, 
2012;MerlerPisany-Ferry, 2012. Also, as Bolton and Jeanne, 2011show, in highly financially integrated 
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countries as is the case of EMU Member States, extended contagion effects may occur. Thus, through the 
banking sector, one countr  to other countries. 
Given the threats to soundness and overall financial stability, it was argued in the literature the need 
of both national budgetary authorities, by fiscal consolidation measures and the Eurosystem, by appropriate 
monetary policy measures, to take action and solve the sovereign debt crisisBarrios et al., 2010; IMF, 
2010;Hellebrandt et al., 2012; De Grawe, 2011; Eijffinger and Hoogduin, 2012. Identifying and quantifying the 
potential or actual effects of the Eurosystem and other central banks  interventions made the subject of some 
other studies like that of Krishnamurty and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011; Szczerbowicz, 2011; Joyce et al., 2011; 
Matheronet. al., 2012 orEijffinger and Hoogduin, 2012. 
3. Interconnections between sovereign debt crisis, banking crisis and the real economy  some arguments 
in favor of s intervention 
Ensuring financial stability is recognized, together with monetary stability, as one of the basic functions of 
modern central banks. However, in practice they rarely assume, by law, explicit objectives in this respect BIS, 
2009. On the background of the recent financial turmoil, this function has gained major importance, financial 
stability becoming a priority for many central banks, at least in the short run. 
intain price stability, while without prejudiciating this objective it must 
also support EU general economic policies. Ensuring financial stability is not an explicit legal objective of 
ECB. However, results from the content of art. 3 of the 
Protocol no. 4 on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, 
annexed to the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which 
stipulates that ECB should make its contribution 
authorities relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and . 
As theory shows, the interconnections established between government and banking sectors largely put their 
mark on overall financial stability. In fact, the two sectors are in close interdependence as,on one hand the 
financial soundness of sovereigns is one of the conditions necessary for ensuring the normal and efficient 
functioning of the financial/banking system and, on the other hand, a sound financial system is vital for the 
fiscal health of sovereigns Caruana and Avdjiev, 2012. 
Fig.1. debt crises and banking crises. Source: the authors 
Recent financial developments confirm the manifestation of these interdependences within the European 
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area. At first, before 2010, the transfer of risk occurred from the financial to government sector, as the public
debt of many European countries rose both as the result of the automatic stabilizers or the discretionary
reactions of public authorities to the economic downturn materialized in lower taxes and higher public
expenditures, and of the financial support granted to banks in distress see figure 1. Thereafter, the downward
spiral continued and a significant risk of disruptions in the activity of credit institutions incurred. Thus,
although at early stages a public finances crisis, the sovereign debt crisis was likely to turn into a banking
crisis, implicitly a funding crisis of the economy due to credit rationing Artus, 2011. Not only the financial
sector would suffer in such a scenario, but rather the real sector, as a result of the reduced access to bank loans
and increasing costs of financing. It can even trigger a vicious cycle, amplifying the economic recession and
leading to higher budget deficits and further debt increases.
An important factor for the transmission of sovereign debt risk to banks in the euro area is represented by
the significant holdings of public debt . Considered low even no risk securities, and
therefore important liquidity reserves for banks, these assets were preferred by euro area credit institutions
before the emergence of the sovereign debt crisis. As can be found in figure 2(a), in the euro area over 7% of 
the total assets of credit institutions consisted of Eurozone government debt loans to general governments and
general government securities, other than shares, equivalent to over one third of the public debt of these 
countries, which shows a significant exposure of the banking sector to sovereign risk.
Although the sovereign debt crisis mainly affected only a few countries namely Greece, Ireland, Portugal,
Spain and Italy, we consider that, due to the high degree of euro area financial integration figure 2(b) shows
that a significant share of the public debt ofthe above mentioned countrieswas held, in 2007, by non-residents -
mainly belonging to other euro area countries, not only the stability of these countries but that of the entire euro
area was under threat, calling for action not only at national, but also supranational level.
Fig. 2.(a) General government debt of Eurozone Member States found in the portfolio of Eurozone credit institutions 2007-2011; (b)
Breakdown of general government debt by residenceof debt holders in some overindebted EMU Member States 2007. Source: (a) the
authors, data from ECB and Eurostat (b) the authors, data from Merler and Pisani-Ferry, 2012
The responsibility to put an endto the sovereign debt crisis mainly goes to the national governments of the 
overindebted countries, forced to adopt harsh fiscal austerity policies, to cut budget deficits and reduce their 
public debt to sustainable levels. However, given the high risk of contagion to the financial and banking sector 
and the threats to financial and macroeconomic stability, these measures had to be completed and
coordinated with similar monetary policy measures adopted by ECB.
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4. reaction to the euro area sovereign debt crisis  main developments and potential risks 
The potentiallyserious implications of the EMU sovereign debt crisis on the banking sector and real 
s responsibility to ensure financial stability, led tosome strong, rapid, 
unprecedented and largemonetary policy reactions. The immediate aim of those measures was to increase the 
liquidityof banks severely affected by the important holdings in their assets portfolio of government bonds 
issued by the EMU Member States in distress, thus supportingbank lending to the real economy andensuringthe 
effective functionning of the monetary policy transmission mechanism ECB, 2011. 
Effectively, ECB resorted to both conventional and unconventional monetary policy measures.The 
conventional ones consisted in decreasing the key policy interest rate from 1% in April 2010 unchanged since 
May 2009 tothe historically low rate of 0.75% in July 2012 and reducingthe minimum reserve requirements 
from 2% to 1 %, in December 2011.In the first phase of the sovereign debt crisis May 2010-June 2011, the 
unconventional monetary policy measures implementedtook the form of the enhanced credit support measures 
fixed-rate main refinancing operations and longer-term refinancing operations - LTROs; special maintenance-
period operations; six-month LTROs; twelve-month LTROs; US dollar-providing operations and covered bond 
purchase programme and the Securities Markets Programme ECB, 2011b. Specific to the context of sovereign 
debt crisis, this latter programme consisted in direct interventions of the Eurosystem on the euro area public 
and private bond markets, given the vital role of the government bond markets in ensuring the efficiency of the 
transmission of ECB's policy rates.
access to finance amplified August-December 2011, the ECB decided to reintroduce and extend a series of 
unconventional monetary policy measures. From the perspective of countering the crisis, of major importance 
were,on the one hand,the reactivation of the Securities Markets Programme and, on the other hand, the launch 
of a second covered bond purchase programme. Also, in December 2011 the ECB decided to implement 
additional measures to support bank lending and euro area money market liquidity, consisting in two long-term 
refinancing operations of Eurozone credit institutions with a maturity of three years and the option of early 
repayment after one year and the increase of collateral availability ECB, 2012. 
Although several empirical studies show that ECB  achieved their aims, we should note that 
maintaining them for a longer period of time may lead to the emergence of some major risks, as follows: 
 maintaining unconventional measures for a longer period of time than required can lead to excessive 
dependence on money base, reducing  incentivesto restructure their balance sheets; 
 thesignificant involvement of ECB in financial intermediation operationsis likely to distort thewell-
functioning of financial markets over the medium and long term; 
 the considerable increase in the size of ECB  balance sheet and change of its structure a higher share of 
government securities may ; 
 maintaining an extremely low key interest rate when growth prospects improve may involve threats to price 
stability, jeopardizing the ental objective; 
 the proactive behavior of ECB duringthe current sovereign crisis could lead to the occurrence of moral 
hazard, as future incentives of national governments to maintain sound public finances would be reduced. 
5. Conclusions 
As theory stipulates, unsustainable public finances sometimes resulting in severe sovereign debt crisis can 
have major negative effects on banking sector and overall financial stability, correlation reiterated during the 
recent Eurozone sovereign debt crisis.Responsible for ensuring financial stability, ECB strongly and quickly 
reacted, by unprecedented and sizeable actions, which had a crucial role in preventing the collapse of the 
financial system and mitigatingthe effects of the crisis on the real economy and the stability of prices.The 
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sovereign debt crisis, in order to ensure the sustainability of public finances, the stability of prices and broader 
financial stability. 
The added value of our work mainly results from the analysis of the intercorrelations between sovereign 
debt crisis, banking crisis and the real sector of the economy, as determinants s intervention in light of 
its responsibility for ensuring broader financial stability and the stability of prices, as well as from highlighting 
 
As future research directions, we intend to evaluate the efficiency of the monetary policy measures adopted 
by ECB for countering the effects of the crisis, on EMU Member States financial markets and real economy. 
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